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A Constitutional Right To Discovery? 
Creating and Reinforcing Due 
Process Norms Through the 
Procedural Laboratory of 
Arbitration 
Imre Stephen Szalai* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A constitutional right to pre-trial discovery?  Absolutely not, so decrees 
the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Supreme Court has held, in a 
criminal case, that there is no general constitutional right to broad 
discovery.1  Of course, in the civil context, modern procedural systems such 
as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure often grant broad procedural rights 
to engage in discovery through a variety of tools such as depositions, 
requests for production of documents, interrogatories, and requests for 
 
* Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law; B.A., Yale University; J.D., 
Columbia Law School.  The author would like to thank Claudette Abdo, Alicia Aguillard, Tessa 
Arnold, Carla Bautista, Ashley Dunn, Marlin Gusman, Chloe Haas, Joseph Hendricks, Marc 
Hoerner, Rebecca Holmes, George Ketry, Janey Lamar, Ryan Lott, Jaime Morgan, Drew Morock, 
Christine Muller, Jami Pellerin, Ariana Pisano, Chad Rice, Marianela Rincon, Abel Rugamas, 
Nicholas Ryan, Joshua Sins, Matthew Steel, Austin Taylor, Cory Thorton, Orlando Vera, Lauren 
Whidden, and Bryan Williams for their helpful comments.   
 1. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right 
to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . . .”). 
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admissions.2  However, are such discovery procedures in the civil context—
which have become the norm in modern litigation—constitutionally 
required?  Would Congress or states, for example, violate the due process 
clause by banning or severely restricting the broad use of discovery in civil 
cases?  If no constitutional right to discovery exists in criminal cases, which 
can involve severe deprivations of life and liberty, then surely it should 
follow that no constitutional right to discovery exists in civil cases.  
Furthermore, broad discovery in courts did not exist when the due process 
clauses were adopted,3 and under a strictly static view of due process, there 
should be no right to discovery. 
This article makes a bold, novel claim: the underpinnings for a due 
process-like norm involving a right to discovery in the civil context have 
begun to take root.4  Where can one observe such a right beginning to 
emerge?  In the laboratory or petri dish of procedural experimentation: 
arbitration. 
 
 2. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 3. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998) (“Prior to [the adoption of] the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) [in 1938], discovery in civil cases in federal court was 
severely limited.  The Federal Rules discovery provisions dramatically increased the potential for 
discovery.”). 
 4. This article is not claiming there is a well-defined constitutional due process right to 
extensive pre-trial discovery in all types of civil cases, such as the broad procedural rights to 
discovery created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Instead, this article claims there is 
evidence for a budding due process-like norm involving a right to limited pre-hearing discovery in 
certain types of civil cases.  Perhaps this limited right to discovery in a civil case can be loosely 
analogized to the limited disclosures that are constitutionally required for a fair trial in the criminal 
context as a result of the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).  See also U.S. v. Clark, No. 05-
80810, 2006 WL 2008511 (E.D. Mich. July 12, 2006) (recognizing that although there is no 
constitutional right to broad discovery in a criminal case, limited disclosures are required in criminal 
cases as a result of Brady). 
2
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/4
  
[Vol. 15: 337, 2015] A Constitutional Right to Discovery? 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
339 
Arbitration is a contractual form of dispute resolution where two parties 
agree to submit their dispute to a neutral third party who will make a binding 
decision.5  The foundation of arbitration is the agreement of the parties to 
submit their dispute to an arbitrator.  In theory, and subject to some limits, 
parties have the freedom of contract to create whatever procedures they 
desire to be used in arbitration.6  As a result of this broad contractual 
freedom, arbitral procedures can vary.7  However, in practice, arbitration can 
often involve limited procedural rights compared to the broader procedural 
rights available in court litigation, such as broad rights to discovery, 
extensive motion practice, and rights to appeal.8 
Arbitration and formal court litigation can be polar extremes, and 
scholars have lamented that, in the legal academy, there is a large divide 
between arbitration on the one hand, and litigation and formal procedures 
 
 5. See MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., 1 DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 1:1 (2014). 
 6. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682-83 (2010). 
 7. See infra Section I. 
 8. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985) (“[By agreeing to arbitrate, a party] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the 
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”); Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. 
Guess? Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“[P]arties to an arbitration are not 
afforded the full panoply of procedural rights available to civil litigants.”).  In contrast to private 
arbitration, court litigation is generally a more formal, public proceeding, and litigating in court 
typically involves extensive procedural rights granted by court rules, such as procedures permitting 
broad discovery and extensive motion practice.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P.; Hodges v. 
Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069, 1075 (La. 2012) (explaining that compared to litigation, arbitration 
typically involves “streamlined discovery” and “little to no motion practice”).  Litigation in court 
also generally involves broader rights to appeal an adverse decision in comparison to the extremely 
limited rights of appeal in connection with an arbitrator’s decision.  Hough v. Osswald, 556 N.E.2d 
765, 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“The object of arbitration is to avoid the formalities, delay and 
expenses of litigation in court.  Judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is more limited that an 
appellate review of a trial court’s decision.”); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 
123 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A federal court’s review of an arbitrator’s decision, however, is extremely 
narrow and exceedingly deferential.  Indeed, it is among the narrowest known in the law.”) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3
Szalai: A Constitutional Right To Discovery? Creating and Reinforcing Due
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 337, 2015] A Constitutional Right to Discovery? 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
340 
governing the civil court system on the other.9  However, the history and 
development of arbitration laws in America demonstrate that there are strong 
relationships between arbitration and the more formal court system.10  For 
example, the push for modern arbitration laws developed, in part, in 
response to a broken, overwhelmed court system of the early 1900s, as 
arbitration could help serve as a safety valve for an overburdened judiciary.11 
This article explores an overlooked dynamic between arbitration and the 
more formal court system.  As developed in more detail below, this article’s 
thesis is that arbitration can help define and reinforce due process norms 
applicable in court, and a due process-like norm regarding discovery is 
beginning to develop.  Courts often review arbitration agreements for 
fairness, and through this judicial review, courts have developed a body of 
law discussing and defining whether certain procedures (or the lack thereof) 
violate fairness norms in connection with the resolution of a particular 
dispute.  Through this body of law exploring procedural fairness, one can 
identify emerging procedural norms, such as a right to discovery in certain 
situations.  Through the procedural creativity and experimentation that 
occurs in arbitration, and through the judicial review of such arbitral 
procedures, arbitration creates countless opportunities to explore and define 
what constitutes the minimum bundle of procedures required for a fair 
hearing. 
Part II of this article provides a general overview of arbitration and 
arbitration procedures.  Part III of this article then explores the legal 
framework supporting arbitration, including how courts review arbitration 
procedures for fundamental fairness.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of 
 
 9. Jean R. Sternlight & Judith Resnik, Forward, Competing and Complementary Rule 
Systems: Civil Procedure and ADR, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481, 487 (2005); see also Jean R. 
Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 681-89 (2005). 
 10. See generally IMRE S. SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 9-10 (2013). 
 11. Id. 
4
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how this judicial review of arbitration procedures helps define and reinforce 
due process norms applicable in courts, particularly with respect to an 
emerging due process right to discovery.12 
II.  ARBITRATION: A PROCEDURAL LABORATORY 
Parties have used arbitration to resolve disputes since the founding of 
the United States.  During the 1800s and early 1900s, arbitration particularly 
thrived among members of trade associations and business groups like the 
New York Chamber of Commerce, which first established arbitration 
facilities to resolve commercial disputes in 1768.13  Today, arbitration is 
used throughout American society to resolve almost every type of dispute in 
a wide variety of contexts, like: employment disputes; disputes between 
consumers and businesses; construction disputes; disputes in the securities 
industry; and disputes involving wills and trusts, to name a few.14 
The foundation for arbitration is the agreement between the parties to 
submit their dispute to an arbitrator, and both the power of the arbitrator and 
the legitimacy of the arbitration proceeding are based on this agreement.15 
 
 12. There are different due process norms that could be analyzed in connection with this 
article, such as norms regarding notice and the neutrality of the decision maker.  This article, 
however, focuses particularly on due process norms regarding discovery.  The impact of arbitration 
on developing due process norms is particularly noticeable with respect to discovery.  As explained 
below, due process norms regarding discovery appear to have changed over time, and arbitration 
helps support these developing norms. 
 13. SZALAI, supra note 10, at 15-19.  The history of arbitration goes back to ancient times.  
DEREK ROEBUCK & BRUNO DE FUMICHON, ROMAN ARBITRATION (2004); DEREK ROEBUCK, 
ANCIENT GREEK ARBITRATION (2001). 
 14. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rachal v. Reitz, 
403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013). 
 15. Bowater N. Am. Corp. v. Murray Mach., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 821, 822-23 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) 
(“As a matter of black letter law arbitration is a matter of contract, and the contours of the 
arbitrator’s authority in a given case are determined by reference to the arbitral agreement.”). 
5
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Because of this contractual foundation for arbitration, the procedures used in 
arbitration proceedings can vary, and arbitration institutions, trade 
associations, and industry groups have developed different sets of arbitration 
rules that parties can adopt through their contracts.  For example, the 
American Arbitration Association has developed several different sets of 
procedural rules for a variety of disputes, such as employment disputes, 
small consumer disputes, complex commercial disputes, construction 
disputes, securities disputes, and wills and trust disputes.16  Furthermore, 
these rules can cover an assortment of issues, such as the number of 
arbitrators, how the arbitrator or arbitrators may be selected, how a party 
may commence an arbitration proceeding, whether parties can amend or 
change their claims, whether motions can be filed, whether and to what 
extent parties will engage in discovery and exchange of information prior to 
a hearing, whether and when a hearing or hearings will occur, deadlines, 
how fees and expenses will be allocated, and numerous other issues.17 
In addition to adopting rules developed by an arbitration association or 
trade group,18 parties have the contractual freedom and flexibility to design 
and control the dispute resolution process by creating their own ad hoc rules.  
As Judge Posner once colorfully wrote: 
 
 16. E.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules (last 
visited June 16, 2014); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVICES, INC. (JAMS), 
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses (last visited June 16, 2014).  For examples of rules developed 
by trade associations or industry organizations, see the Arbitration Rules of the National Grain and 
Feed Association, http://www.ngfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014_Arb_Rules.pdf (last visited June 
16, 2014); Arbitration Rules of the Producers Guild of America, 
http://www.producersguild.org/?page=coc_rga (last visited June 16, 2014); and the Arbitration Rules 
of the American Cotton Shippers Association, http://www.acsa-cotton.org/rules-and-policies/acsa-
arbitration-rules-2 (last visited June 16, 2014). 
 17. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 16. 
 18. A party can agree to adopt rules of a trade group even if the party is not a member of the 
trade group.  See, e.g., Hodge Brothers, Inc. v. DeLong Co., 942 F. Supp. 412, 419 (W.D. Wis. 
1996) (compelling arbitration where agreement incorporated by reference rules of a trade 
association, even though the plaintiffs were not members of the trade association).     
6
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Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of 
three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the 
arbitration of their disputes; parties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbitration 
as they are to specify any other terms in their contract.19 
Parties have the freedom to design “tailor-made” arbitration agreements.20  
For example, in one case involving two sophisticated corporate entities, the 
parties created their own arbitral procedures, and a court noted that “every 
provision of this arbitration agreement reveal[ed] that this is a complex 
matter, both technically and legally.”21  The parties devised a unique 
arbitration agreement providing for “extensive discovery[,] contain[ing] 
unusual provisions for waivers, statute of limitations, res judicata and 
recorded proceedings[,] and mandat[ing] detailed findings by the panel [ . . . 
due to] potential claims by and against vendors, consultants[,] and other 
interested third parties.”22 
Procedural creativity can flourish more powerfully, easily, and quickly 
in the arbitral setting as opposed to the courts.  Of course, procedural rules in 
court can, and do, change over time through legislative action or through 
extensive, multi-stage, rulemaking proceedings.23  However, such changes of 
court procedural rules can be a relatively slow, glacial political process when 
compared to the creation of rules in the arbitral setting.  Because of the 
contractual freedom available to parties to construct their own arbitration 
 
 19. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 20. Oakland-Macomb Interceptor Drain Drainage Dist. v. Ric-Man Constr., Inc., 850 N.W.2d 
498 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). 
 21. Id. at 500. 
 22. Id. at 500-01. 
 23. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., § 1001 POWER TO REGULATE PROCEDURE AS 
LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL, 4 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1001 (3d ed. 2014) (recognizing 
Congressional power to control procedures in federal courts).  For a helpful description of how 
procedural rules are developed for the federal courts, see Judge John D. Bates, How the Rulemaking 
Process Works, Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rulemaking-process-
works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx#summary-procedures (last visited June 18, 2014). 
7
Szalai: A Constitutional Right To Discovery? Creating and Reinforcing Due
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 337, 2015] A Constitutional Right to Discovery? 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
344 
procedures, arbitration can function as a procedural laboratory for 
experimentation, where new procedures can instantaneously spring to life 
through the signing of a contract. 
III.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUPPORTING ARBITRATION 
A.   The Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act 
As mentioned above, parties have used arbitration in the United States 
since pre-Revolutionary War days, and parties have probably used 
arbitration since the beginning of time.24  However, whether a legal system 
supports the use of arbitration is a completely distinct issue from the use of 
arbitration. 
Even though arbitration was in use in American society since the earliest 
days of the United States, the legal system in the United States did not 
provide broad support for arbitration until the 1920s when modern 
arbitration laws were enacted.25  Prior to the 1920s, courts in the United 
States generally refused to enforce arbitration agreements because of a 
judicial mistrust or hostility towards arbitration.26  Before modern arbitration 
laws were adopted, parties to an arbitration agreement could back out at any 
time prior to the issuance of an arbitration award because courts typically 
refused to compel specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute.27  Although the law at the time did not give broad support for 
arbitration, merchants in pre-1920s America may have voluntarily agreed to 
comply with agreements to arbitrate because of their own self-interest in 
maintaining a good reputation within a small business community, or 
 
 24. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 25. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, 
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992). 
 26. Id. at 19-20 (noting that although laws were supportive of arbitration, there was a “relative 
lack of enforceability of such agreements before an award was made”).   
 27. Id. 
8
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perhaps because of the threat of expulsion from a trade organization if they 
refused to arbitrate.28 
As the economy in America became more nationalized and such 
informal pressures from within a smaller community became less 
significant, business interests began to lobby in the early 1900s for laws that 
would make arbitration agreements binding.29  Also, reforming arbitration 
laws became attractive to merchants because merchants were frustrated with 
overly complex, confusing, and time-consuming court procedures of the 
time.30  Business interests desired strong arbitration laws so that arbitration 
could spread beyond small communities or trade associations, and so that 
they could have an effective, efficient, and binding alternative for resolving 
disputes with distant merchants outside of the court system, which was 
heavily criticized as broken and overwhelmed at the time.31  With pressure 
from the New York State Bar Association, the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, and numerous other New York business interests, the state of 
New York enacted the country’s first modern arbitration law in 1920.32  This 
New York law, which was the first modern arbitration statute in America, 
made pre-dispute arbitration agreements binding and enforceable, and 
 
 28. Samuel Williams Cooper, The Law’s Delay, 19 THE AMERICAN, 499, 394 (1890) (“The 
rules of the various trade associations throughout the country contain provisions that differences 
between members shall be settled by arbitration before an appropriate committee, and the fact that 
any member appeals to the court for his rights made the ground for his expulsion from the society.”); 
Farmer v. Bd. of Trade of Kans. City, 78 Mo. App. 557, 566-67 (1899) (“It is well known that 
parties can not by agreement to arbitrate future differences, oust the courts of jurisdiction.  But that 
principle of law does not affect our statement that the association may have a rule requiring all 
differences between members to be settled by arbitration and to impose expulsion as a penalty for 
disobedience of such rule.”); DON ANTONIO DE ALCEDO, NEW YORK, III THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND 
HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES 408 (stating that refusal of a member 
of a New York trade organization to submit a dispute to arbitration would result in the member’s 
expulsion from the organization) (G.A. Thompson trans., 1812). 
 29. See generally SZALAI, supra note 10. 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. See generally id. 
 32. Id. at 83-88. 
9
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allowed parties to escape New York’s broken, complex court system of the 
time.33 
  Similarly, in 1925, with strong lobbying from business groups and 
the American Bar Association, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), which was directly patterned after the New York arbitration law 
and which became the main federal law regulating arbitration agreements.34  
Like the ground-breaking New York arbitration statute of 1920, the core 
language of the FAA declares that arbitration agreements involving 
interstate commerce are generally “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”35 
It cannot be overstressed that the enactment of modern arbitration laws 
during the 1920s—at both the state and federal levels—was a response to 
overburdened, broken, and hypertechnical court systems.36  In other words, a 
driving force behind the enactment of modern arbitration laws was a desire 
to allow parties to engage in procedural experimentation outside of the 
courts.  If parties disliked existing court procedures, the FAA bestowed 
power on parties to design their own individualized, private court systems 
through arbitration agreements enforceable by the courts. 
B.  Judicial Review of Agreements to Arbitrate 
The formal court system and the arbitration system supported by the 
FAA are not entirely separate.  These two systems are integrated to a certain 
degree, in both visible and less visible ways.  Through the FAA, Congress 
expressly delegated to the courts the power to enforce arbitration 
agreements, and through this judicial process, to regulate and to supervise 
such agreements. 
 
 33. Id.; Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 36. See generally SZALAI, supra note 10. 
10
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The heart of the FAA, section 2, declares that arbitration agreements are 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”37  The remaining provisions 
of FAA help carry out this directive from section 2 by generally providing 
for judicial support of arbitration agreements in different ways,38 although 
parties may not invoke judicial support in every situation.  To illustrate, 
suppose two parties enter into an agreement to arbitrate certain disputes that 
may arise between them in the future.  If such a dispute does materialize, the 
parties may willingly comply with their preexisting agreement to arbitrate, 
commence an arbitration proceeding, and abide by whatever decision the 
arbitrator renders.  If the parties fully comply with their agreement in such a 
manner, a court may never become involved with their dispute resolution. 
However, if one of the parties fails to comply with the arbitration 
agreement by refusing to participate in an arbitration proceeding, the FAA 
allows the other party to petition a court to enforce the agreement and 
compel the resistant party to honor the arbitration agreement.39  In such a 
proceeding, a court typically examines two main issues: 1) whether a valid 
agreement to arbitrate exists; and 2) if such an agreement exists, whether the 
dispute at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.40  If there is 
 
 37. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 38. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (providing for a stay of litigation if an issue in the litigation 
is referable to arbitration pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate); 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (providing for a 
court order compelling a recalcitrant party to honor an agreement to arbitrate); 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) 
(providing for the court appointment of an arbitrator if a party fails to name an arbitrator pursuant to 
an agreement to arbitrate); 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (providing for a court order compelling a witness to 
attend an arbitration proceeding if the witness refuses to obey a summons issued by an arbitrator).   
 39. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 40. Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1996) (When deciding whether to 
compel arbitration, a court decides “(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the 
parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement.”) 
(citations omitted); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2003); Kulig v. 
Midland Funding, LLC, 13 CIV. 4715 PKC, 2013 WL 6017444 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013) 
(“[C]ourts apply a conjunctive two-part test to determine arbitrability of claims, asking: (1) whether 
the parties have entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether the dispute at issue 
11
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a valid agreement and the dispute falls within its coverage, the FAA requires 
the court to enforce the agreement by issuing an order compelling 
arbitration.41 
During this process of determining whether a valid agreement exists, a 
court may review the fairness of the procedures to be used in arbitration.42  If 
the procedures are one-sided, a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration 
agreement and deny a petition to compel arbitration.43  For example, 
sometimes a stronger party, such as a corporation or employer, may draft a 
one-sided arbitration agreement with unfair procedures to be imposed on the 
weaker party, in an attempt to create an unlevel playing field for dispute 
resolution. 
A well-known case in point of a court refusing to enforce a one-sided 
arbitration agreement involves a Hooters restaurant that required its 
employees to sign an arbitration agreement with egregiously unfair 
arbitration procedures.44  These procedures required the employee to set 
forth details of his or her allegations along with a list of witnesses at the time 
of filing a claim, but the company was not required to reciprocate with its 
own responsive pleading, defenses, or list of witnesses.45  Also, Hooters 
prepared the list of arbitrators a plaintiff employee had to choose from, and 
such a list raised concerns about the impartiality of the arbitrators.46  
Furthermore, Hooters could move for summary dismissal of an employee’s 
claims, but employees had no corresponding right under the arbitration 
 
comes within the scope of the arbitration agreement.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 41. Amegy Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Monarch Flight II, LLC, 870 F. Supp. 2d 441, 447 (S.D. Tex. 
2012) (“The FAA ‘leaves no place’ for the court to exercise discretion.  The court must direct the 
parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 42. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 938-39. 
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rules.47  The agreement also granted Hooters, but not employees, the right to 
cancel or modify the arbitration agreement.48  Among the other problematic 
clauses in Hooters’ arbitration agreement, the agreement imposed severe 
discovery limitations on employees attempting to bring a claim in 
arbitration.49  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
refused to enforce Hooters’ arbitration agreement, finding that the 
procedures set forth in the agreement “when taken as a whole . . . are so one-
sided that their only possible purpose is to undermine the neutrality of the 
proceeding.”50 
To conclude this section, courts have refused to compel arbitration when 
an arbitration agreement contains one-sided, unfair procedures.  In other 
words, courts serve a limited—but critical—role in policing arbitration 
agreements for procedural fairness.  As part of this judicial monitoring or 
review of arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA, courts have struck 
down a host of unfair arbitration procedures or rules, including: prohibitive 
arbitration fees; restrictions on an arbitrator’s ability to award relief; 
discovery limitations; shortened time periods to file claims in arbitration; 
restrictions on joinder of parties; and arbitrator selection procedures raising 
concerns about arbitrator bias.51 
 
 47. Id. at 939. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614-15 (D.S.C. 1998), aff’d, 173 
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 50. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).   
 51. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (prohibition of class 
action joinder); Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(arbitration selection procedures); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(prohibitive fees); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1995) (restrictions 
on relief and shortened statute of limitations); Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 
538 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (discovery limits). 
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IV.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES HELPS DEFINE AND 
REINFORCE DUE PROCESS NORMS APPLICABLE IN COURTS 
As discussed in the prior sections, through the FAA, courts play a role in 
policing the procedural laboratory of arbitration.  This role is significant 
because through this judicial review, courts are continuously producing 
opinions assessing the fairness of a variety of procedures in connection with 
a broad range of underlying disputes.  Because of the contractual freedom to 
design an arbitration proceeding, there can be a multitude of different types 
of proceedings, each with its own unique bundle of procedures.  In effect, 
each arbitration agreement establishes a different procedural system—or 
bundle of rights—to resolve a particular dispute, and judicial review of 
arbitration agreements produces a body of precedent evaluating the fairness 
of these different systems vis-à-vis a broad array of disputes.  With the 
widespread use of consumer, employment, and commercial arbitration, there 
are likely millions of arbitration agreements in the United States.  Each time 
a distinct dispute arises between two parties to an arbitration agreement and 
a court is asked to enforce the arbitration agreement under the FAA, a court 
may in effect produce a snapshot of what procedural fairness means for a 
particular set of facts for the parties involved.  Through these judicial 
snapshots or court opinions, one can discover the development of due 
process-like norms. 
To help illustrate how arbitration can assist with defining due process-
like norms, this section of the article focuses on judicial review of arbitral 
procedures regarding discovery.52  First, this section examines several cases 
in which courts evaluate the procedural fairness of discovery limits in 
arbitration.  Second, this section discusses how these judicial fairness cases 
relate to due process concerns.  Finally, this section concludes by exploring 
 
 52. Through judicial review of arbitration, one can also see cases examining other due process 
norms, such as norms regarding notice of proceedings.  See, e.g., Amalgamated Cotton Garmen & 
Allied Indus. Fund v. J.B.C. Co. of Madera, 608 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (discussing a right to 
receive notice).  However, this article focuses on discovery. 
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how arbitration can be used to define and reinforce due process rights, 
particularly with respect to discovery.  As explained below, this case law 
evaluating procedural fairness in arbitration suggests there is a developing 
due process-like norm involving a right to pre-trial discovery in certain 
circumstances. 
A. Judicial Review of Discovery Limits in Arbitration 
The Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed discovery limits 
in an arbitration agreement when assessing the enforceability of the 
agreement.  In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court 
addressed whether a claim under the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act could be subject to arbitration.53  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court held that federal civil rights claims, like many other statutory claims, 
can be subject to arbitration, and in doing so, the court assessed the fairness 
of various arbitration procedures, including the limited discovery procedures 
available under the arbitration agreement at issue.54 
In trying to resist the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the 
plaintiff employee in Gilmer challenged “the adequacy of arbitration 
procedures” set forth in the agreement, including limited discovery 
procedures.55  The Court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s arguments about 
the inadequacy of the arbitration procedures in this case.56  However, the 
Court recognized that in other situations, limits on discovery may be 
problematic: 
Gilmer also complains that the discovery allowed in arbitration is more limited than in 
the federal courts, which he contends will make it difficult to prove discrimination.  It is 
unlikely, however, that age discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than 
other claims that we have found to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims.  
 
 53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 30.  
 56. Id. at 30-32. 
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Moreover, there has been no showing in this case that the NYSE discovery provisions, 
which allow for document production, information requests, depositions, and subpoenas 
will prove insufficient to allow ADEA claimants such as Gilmer a fair opportunity to 
present their claims.57 
The particular limits on discovery and other procedural concerns raised by 
the plaintiff employee were not problematic for the arbitration agreement at 
issue in Gilmer.58  However, the Supreme Court in Gilmer left open the 
possibility that parties may be able to demonstrate “procedural inadequacies 
. . . in specific cases” in the future.59 
Several federal and state courts have found arbitration agreements to be 
unenforceable due to limited discovery procedures allowed for in arbitration.  
For example, in Fitz v. NCR Corp., an employee filed a wrongful 
termination lawsuit against her employer, and the employer asked the court 
to compel arbitration.60  The arbitration agreement in Fitz limited discovery 
“to the sworn deposition statements of two individuals and any expert 
witnesses expected to testify at the arbitration hearing.”61  In addition to 
these depositions, the arbitration procedures required the parties to exchange 
exhibits and a list of witnesses to be used during arbitration at least two 
weeks prior to the hearing, and the agreement generally prohibited other 
discovery unless the arbitrator determined there was a compelling need.62  
Noting that “adequate discovery is indispensable” for a fair proceeding, the 
Fitz court found that the “arbitration clause does not permit discovery 
necessary to make a fair hearing possible,” and the deposition limits unfairly 
“place[d the plaintiff employee] at a disadvantage in proving her claims.”63  
The court reasoned that, in the employment setting, the defendant employer 
 
 57. Id. at 31 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 30-32. 
 59. Id. at 33. 
 60. Fitz v. NCR Corp, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 61. Id. at 97. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 97-98. 
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was likely to have control over many of the documents or witnesses relevant 
to the employee’s claims, and a two deposition limit imposed on the 
employee was procedurally inadequate when considering the “complexity of 
employment disputes, the outcomes of which are often determined by the 
testimony of percipient witnesses, as well as written information about the 
disputed employment practice.”64  The court also found that the burden 
imposed by these limits on discovery outweighed any potential benefit the 
employee could derive from these limits.65  In sum, the Fitz court found that 
the discovery procedures under the arbitration agreement fell short of “a 
minimum standard of fairness” because the arbitration agreement “fail[ed] to 
ensure that [the plaintiff employee] is entitled to discovery sufficient to 
adequately arbitrate her claims.”66 
Similarly, in another employment arbitration case called Ontiveros v. 
DHL Exp., a court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement whose 
discovery procedures limited the parties to a request for production of 
documents and the deposition of one individual and any expert witness.67  
The court found that the limited arbitral discovery was procedurally 
inadequate and would frustrate the plaintiff employee’s ability to prove 
harassment and discrimination claims because the alleged wrongdoing 
occurred on two different job sites and involved numerous employees over a 
four-year period.68 
When evaluating whether to enforce an arbitration agreement, state and 
federal courts have found the following discovery limits in arbitration 
agreements to be procedurally unfair: 
 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 99-100. 
 67. Ontiveros v. DHL Exp, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 68. Id. at 487-88. 
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• In connection with civil rights claims for age and disability 
discrimination in the employment context, the arbitration agreement 
contained procedures allowing for only three depositions and 
requests for relevant documents, and the procedures forbid the use of 
interrogatories and requests for admissions unless the employer 
consented to such written forms of discovery;69 
 
• In connection with a retaliatory discharge employment dispute, the 
arbitration agreement failed to contain any “express provision for 
discovery rights”;70 
 
• In connection with fraudulent inducement claims involving a 
cooperative marketing agreement in the agricultural setting, the 
arbitration agreement provided that discovery would be permitted at 
the sole discretion of the arbitration panel, but the agreement 
provided virtually no time for discovery to occur (as the arbitration 
panel had to issue its report within thirty days of receiving claims);71 
 
• In connection with claims for retaliation, age discrimination, and 
disability discrimination in the employment context, the arbitration 
agreement contained procedures for one request for production of 
 
 69. Hulett v. Capitol Auto Grp., Inc., No. 07-6151-AA, 2007 WL 3232283 (D. Or. Oct. 29, 
2007).  
 70. Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Servs., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 71. See Brief of Appellees, Venture Cotton Cooperative v. Freeman, No. 11-11-00093-CV, 
2011 WL 7452136 (Tex. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (arguing discovery limitations in arbitration clause 
were unconscionable); Venture Cotton Cooperative v. Freeman, 395 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App. 2013) 
(affirming trial court’s order finding arbitration agreement to be substantively unconscionable), rev’d 
on other grounds by Venture Cotton Cooperative v. Freeman, No. 13-0122, 2014 WL 2619535 (Tex. 
June 13, 2013).    
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documents involving twenty-five questions, two days of depositions, 
and one day of deposition of experts;72 
 
• In connection with civil rights claims for age and ethnicity 
discrimination in the employment context, arbitration agreement 
limited discovery to one request for production of documents and 
two depositions absent relief from the arbitrator on a finding of good 
cause;73 
• In connection with a personal injury action alleging negligence in an 
assisted living facility, the arbitration agreement permitted all 
discovery allowed under court rules, but under a shortened timeline, 
and depositions were limited to expert witnesses;74 
 
• In connection with a wrongful discharge employment dispute, an 
arbitration agreement included discovery rules permitting document 
requests, but prohibiting interrogatories and limiting depositions to 
one individual and any expert witness unless the arbitrator finds a 
substantial need;75 
 
• In connection with a sexual harassment employment dispute, the 
arbitration agreement limited depositions to one person unless 
arbitrator finds a substantial need;76 
 
 
 72. Reid v. Optumhealth Care Solutions, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00747-ST, 2012 WL 6738542 (D. 
Or. Oct. 11, 2012). 
 73. Jara v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. B234089, 2012 WL 3065307 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
30, 2012). 
 74. Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 75. See Brief of Appellant, Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 02-15232, 2002 WL 
32145133 (9th Cir. June 7, 2002) (describing discovery provisions in arbitration agreement); 
Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 70 Fed. App’x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 76. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 601 (D.S.C. 1998). 
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• In connection with a wrongful termination employment dispute, the 
arbitration agreement provided that “[n]either party shall be entitled 
to written or deposition discovery from the other, except with respect 
to damages”;77 
 
• In connection with alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, the arbitration agreement provided for one deposition, unless the 
arbitrators found exceptional circumstances;78 
 
• In connection with retaliatory discharge and age discrimination 
claims, the arbitration agreement limited discovery to depositions of 
two individuals and any expert witnesses, unless arbitrator found 
compelling circumstances;79 
 
• In connection with sexual discrimination and retaliation claims, the 
arbitration agreement limited discovery to one deposition, unless the 
arbitrator found good cause;80 
 
• In connection with age discrimination claims, the arbitration 
agreement limited depositions to only one person, unless arbitrator 
approves request for additional discovery;81 and 
 
• In connection with sexual harassment, retaliation, and hostile work 
environment claims, the arbitration agreement contained discovery 
procedures providing for three depositions and a deposition of a 
 
 77. Openshaw v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 987, 995 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 78. Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 387 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 79. Doubt v. NCR Corp., No C 09-05917, 2010 WL 3619854 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010). 
 80. Hamrick v. Aqua Glass, Inc., No. 07-3089-CL, 2008 WL 2853992 (D. Or. Feb. 20, 2008). 
 81. Sherwood v. Blue Cross, No. CIV S-07-633, 2007 WL 2705262 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 
2007).   
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corporate representative limited to no more than four designated 
subjects.82 
 
One general observation about the above cases is that most, but not all, 
of the reported cases discussing inappropriately severe discovery limits 
involve the employment setting, and more particularly, civil rights disputes.  
However, not all of these cases involve employment disputes.  For example, 
the Ostroff case involved a personal injury dispute arising out of an accident 
in a nursing home,83 and the Venture Cotton case involved a contractual 
dispute between farmers and a cotton cooperative marketing association.84 
Another general observation regarding the above cases is that a court’s 
invalidation of a severe discovery limit as being fundamentally unfair tends 
to involve a fact-specific analysis.  In other words, the mere fact that an 
employment claim is at issue will not likely result in the invalidation of a 
severe discovery limit, and a two deposition limit in arbitration may not 
always be inappropriate.  Instead, courts tend to examine a plaintiff’s 
particular factual allegations in light of the discovery provisions in order to 
assess whether the limited discovery provisions are procedurally unfair.  For 
example, in Reid v. Optumhealth Care Solutions, Inc., the federal court 
found that the two-day deposition limit in the arbitration agreement would 
be procedurally unfair for the plaintiff employee because her allegations of 
wrongdoing involved a team of other employees and supervisors spread 
across five states, along with other witnesses located in a sixth state.85  The 
court observed that “[e]mployment discrimination claims are notoriously 
fact intensive,” and in light of the plaintiff’s specific allegations, involving 
important witnesses spread across six states, the two-day discovery limit at 
issue would hinder the plaintiff’s ability to present her discrimination 
 
 82. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 83. Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 84. Venture Cotton Co-op. v. Freeman, 435 S.W. 3d 222, 225 (Tex. 2014). 
 85. Reid v. Optumhealth Care Solutions, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00747-ST, 2012 WL 6738542, at 
*8 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012). 
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claims.86  Similarly, in Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., which involved 
negligence claims against an assisted-living facility, the court examined 
several of the plaintiff’s specific allegations of wrongdoing from the 
complaint, and the court recognized that in order to prove these particular 
allegations, the plaintiff would need to depose several of the defendant’s 
employees and other residents.87  In light of these specific allegations, the 
arbitral discovery rules limiting depositions solely to the other party’s 
experts would deny the plaintiff “a fair opportunity to present her claims.”88 
In sum, there is a body of case law recognizing a general principle that 
limits on discovery in arbitration cannot fall below a minimum threshold and 
deprive a party of a fair opportunity to present its claims in arbitration.  
Although most reported cases are employment related and involve statutory 
claims, this general principle is not limited to the employment context or 
statutory claims.  Thus, according to these opinions, a minimum acceptable 
level of discovery or a minimum bundle of discovery rights is necessary for 
an arbitration agreement to be enforceable—at least in certain contexts, and 
the arbitral discovery in the cases discussed above failed to meet this 
threshold. 
B. Due Process and Arbitration 
Do constitutional due process rights apply in arbitration?  In order for 
such rights to apply, it is fundamental that state action must exist, and 
whether arbitration under the FAA involves state action is a matter of 
debate.  Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole has written an outstanding article 
analyzing the state action doctrine and different types of arbitration, and she 
ultimately concludes that “there is no state action in contractual arbitration” 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Ostroff, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 88. Id. at 546 (citation omitted). 
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under the FAA.89  She reasons that contractual arbitration does not trigger 
state action “because arbitration involves private parties using privately 
created dispute resolution mechanisms.”90  Moreover, even if a party invokes 
the court system to enforce an arbitration agreement or award, she concludes 
there is no state action.91  She reasons that merely obtaining such a remedy 
from a court would not transform an out-of-court, private arbitration 
proceeding into state action because compelling arbitration or enforcing an 
award does not involve a state official jointly, overtly, and significantly 
participating with the private parties in the arbitration process.92 
Several courts have explicitly held that arbitration does not involve state 
action.  For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has rejected the argument that court support of arbitration through 
the FAA transforms arbitration into state action.93  The court analogized 
arbitration agreements to other private contracts, and the court reasoned that 
court enforcement of contracts does not convert private contractual 
obligations into state action: 
Arbitration is a private self-help remedy.  The American Arbitration Association is a 
private organization selling a private service to private parties who are under no legal 
obligation to agree to arbitrate their disputes or, if they decide to use arbitration to resolve 
disputes, to use the services of the Association, which is not the only provider of such 
services.  When arbitrators issue awards, they do so pursuant to the disputants’ contract—
in fact the award is a supplemental contract obligating the losing party to pay the winner.  
The fact that the courts enforce these contracts, just as they enforce other contracts, does 
not convert the contracts into state or federal action . . . .94 
 
 89. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2005). 
 90. Id. at 46. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 233 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 94. Id. at 507 (citations omitted).   
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Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, along 
with numerous other courts, has held that “the state action element of a due 
process claim is absent in private arbitration cases.”95 
However, there are conflicting views.  Some scholars have found state 
action to exist in connection with contractual arbitration, and it appears that 
some courts have applied due process norms when analyzing arbitration.  
Professor Richard C. Reuben has written a thorough, exceptional article 
concluding that state action exists in contractual arbitration because of the 
“statutory schemes that establish an intimate involvement between 
arbitrators and the public courts,” and because of the privileges the 
government grants to arbitrators, including immunity from civil liability and 
powers to sanction and administer discovery.96  He also reasons that the 
binding resolution of disputes is a “traditionally exclusive public function,” 
and when the government delegates this public function to arbitrators 
through the FAA, such a delegation transforms the arbitrators into public 
actors operating under the color of state law.97 
Professor Jean R. Sternlight has also written an outstanding article 
concluding that “the creation of an elaborate state enforcement mechanism, 
 
 95. Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The FDIC argues also 
that it had a due process right to an oral hearing.  The arbitration involved here was private, not state, 
action; it was conducted pursuant to contract by a private arbitrator.  Although Congress, in the 
exercise of its commerce power, has provided for some governmental regulation of private 
arbitration agreements, we do not find in private arbitration proceedings the state action requisite for 
a constitutional due process claim.”); Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (“Private arbitration, however, really is private; and since constitutional rights are in 
general rights against government officials and agencies rather than against private individuals and 
organizations, the fact that a private arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that are encompassed 
by the term ‘due process of law’ cannot give rise to a constitutional complaint.”); Cremin v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1468 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[C]ourts have 
consistently held that private arbitration lacks any element of state action.”). 
 96. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1005-06, 1016-17 (2000). 
 97. Id. at 997-98, 1016-17. 
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deliberately designed to allow enforcement of private agreements, does 
constitute state action.”98  Moreover, Professor Sternlight compellingly 
argues that courts may not be acting in a neutral manner when enforcing the 
intentions of parties in connection with arbitration.99  Courts have adopted 
strong preferences for arbitration when interpreting the FAA, and as a result, 
courts frequently impose arbitration on weaker parties who have not 
knowingly or voluntarily agreed to arbitrate.100  In effect, courts are forcing 
private parties to resolve disputes in arbitration when a genuine agreement to 
arbitrate is lacking, and in such circumstances of a state imposing arbitration 
on unwilling parties, state action exists.101 
Even though some courts have stated that arbitration does not involve 
state action, and hence, the due process clause does not apply, other courts 
have applied due process norms when analyzing arbitration.  As explained 
by an appellate court: 
Although arbitration proceedings are not held to the same strict rules as are the courts, 
nonetheless, an arbitrator must be vigilant in affording basic due process requirements.  
The first and foremost requirement is the opportunity to present evidence and to be 
heard.102 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
applied due process norms to contractual arbitration.  In the case of In re 
Wal-Mark Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation, the Ninth 
Circuit recognized that when parties are drafting arbitration agreements, 
parties cannot contractually undermine “a minimum level of due process for 
 
 98. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 43 (1997). 
 99. Id. at 44-47. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Pennington v. Cuna Brokerage Sec., Inc., 5 So. 3d 172, 176 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (citations 
omitted). 
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parties to an arbitration.”103  The Ninth Circuit noted that when courts 
consider vacating an arbitrator’s award, courts are in effect reviewing 
whether “due process” and “elementary procedural fairness” exist in 
connection with the arbitration proceeding.104 
In the Fourth Circuit’s Hooters case discussed above,105 where the court 
invalidated the arbitration clause due to severe discovery limits and other 
unfair procedures, the Fourth Circuit found that the arbitral procedures were 
“so one-sided” that as a result, such procedures “undermine[d] the neutrality 
of the proceeding.”106  In finding that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable, the court relied on expert testimony that the procedures 
significantly “deviated from minimum due process standards,” “violated 
fundamental concepts of fairness,” and were “inconsistent” with a “fair and 
impartial” hearing.107 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court analyzed 
class action arbitrations administered by the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA).108  In discussing whether such arbitration is appropriate, 
the Supreme Court relied on its landmark decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, which helped define due process rights in the context of judicial 
class actions.109  The Concepcion Court explained that judicial class actions 
required several procedural protections in order for the class action to be 
binding on the parties.110  The Court then borrowed this due process analysis 
for judicial class actions, applied the analysis to arbitral class actions, and 
concluded that “[a]t least this amount of process would presumably be 
 
 103. In re Wal-Mart Wage, 737 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 933 (4th Cir. 1999); see supra notes 
44-50 and accompanying text.   
 106. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d at 939. 
 107. Id. 
 108. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). 
 109. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). 
 110. Id. 
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required for absent parties to be bound by the results of [a class action] 
arbitration.”111  The Court suggested that the AAA’s special class procedures 
for arbitration comported with these due process requirements.112  Even 
though the Court’s discussion of the AAA’s rules was dicta and the case 
involved the unique setting of class procedures, the Court nevertheless 
analyzed the AAA’s rules using the lens of due process.113 
In sum, there are conflicting views from courts as well as scholars 
regarding whether arbitration under the FAA involves state action, and thus, 
triggers due process concerns.  Personally, I favor the view that state action 
and due process apply to arbitration under the FAA for all the reasons 
persuasively argued by Professor Reuben and Professor Sternlight. 
Furthermore, when one examines the FAA on a more macro and 
historical level, there are additional arguments supporting Professor 
Reuben’s and Professor Sternlight’s conclusion that arbitration under the 
FAA should involve state action.  In private practice, I was accustomed to 
viewing the FAA solely in terms of how the FAA could shape dispute 
resolution between two parties.  However, in my research regarding the 
history and development of modern arbitration laws, I began to view the 
FAA on a broader, macro scale as a safety valve for an overburdened 
judiciary.114  When enacting the FAA, Congress delegated binding decision-
making authority to arbitrators in an attempt to relieve an overburdened, 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(acknowledging “due-process concerns” with complex procedures used in arbitration); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Fioravanti, 299 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 1973) (analyzing arbitration proceeding and concluding 
that the arbitral “hearing had the necessary essentials of due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to 
be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal 
having jurisdiction of the cause”); Donegal Ins. Co. v. Longo, 610 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992) (holding that arbitration proceeding was “not fair and did not comport with procedural due 
process”).  
 114. See generally SZALAI, supra note 10. 
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broken court system of the early 1900s.115  When Congress created the FAA, 
Congress established an interconnected relationship between the formal 
court system and this binding system of arbitration supported by the FAA in 
order to serve a critical public function and alleviate overburdened courts.  
This historical context stresses the delegation of authority that occurred in 
connection with the FAA’s enactment, and this delegation context helps 
support Professor Reuben’s arguments that contractual arbitration involves a 
public function.116 
To illustrate the public role served by this system of arbitration 
established by the FAA, consider the case of Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. 
Jacobson, which arose out of the infamous Black Monday stock market 
collapse of October 1987.117  In the immediate wake of this crash, a 
brokerage firm liquidated an investor’s sizeable portfolio.118  The investor 
subsequently demanded the reinstatement of his account because he believed 
the brokerage firm had no contractual right to liquidate his portfolio.  The 
investor eventually commenced an arbitration, which resulted in a $1.8 
million award in his favor against the brokerage firm.119  When the 
brokerage firm filed a court action to vacate the arbitrator’s award, the 
federal district court in Manhattan refused to vacate the award, explaining 
that the award of the expert arbitrators was final as it did not trigger the 
extremely narrow justifications for vacating an award under the FAA.120 
This Manhattan federal court noted that the brokerage firm was merely 
arguing that the arbitrators’ decision was erroneous, but such arguments do 
not justify the vacating of an arbitrator’s award under the FAA.121  The court 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 994-96, 997-99 (2000). 
 117. Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Jacobson, 126 F.R.D. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 24-25. 
 120. Id. at 25-26. 
 121. Id. 
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stressed that if such arguments regarding the arbitrators’ errors could 
invalidate an arbitration award, “then the entire force of New York Stock 
Exchange and similar arbitration proceedings is undermined 
significantly.”122 
Consider the broader context of this arbitration award and the court’s 
decision to leave the award intact.  This Manhattan federal court—which is 
the oldest, busiest, and largest federal court in the country123—was probably 
concerned with a flood of disputes associated with the Black Monday stock 
market crash.  At the end of the opinion, the court sanctioned the lawyers for 
the brokerage firm because the lawyers improperly filed a frivolous motion 
to vacate the arbitrator’s award.124  Sanctioning under these circumstances 
helps signal to other parties the court’s reluctance to overturn the strong 
finality of arbitrators’ awards.  In issuing sanctions, the Manhattan federal 
court was trying to protect the critical public role of arbitration as an 
“expeditious, efficient, and definitive” safety valve for an overburdened 
judiciary,125 particularly under these circumstances, where many disputes 
could be expected to arise out of the Black Monday stock market crash.  
This interdependent relationship between the formal judicial system and the 
binding system of arbitration, as illustrated by the Quick & Reilly case, helps 
support the views and conclusions of Professor Reuben regarding state 
action.126 
 Another aspect regarding the FAA’s history is further helpful in 
supporting Professor Sternlight’s arguments that arbitration involves state 
action because courts are not acting in a neutral manner when enforcing 
 
 122. Id. at 25. 
 123. Report and Recommendations of the Southern District of New York Civil Justice Reform 
Act Advisory Group, 1991 WL 525131 (Nov. 1, 1991); Phil Schatz, Hon. Loretta A. Preska Chief 
U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York, 60 FED. LAWYER 22 (Dec. 2013). 
 124. Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Jacobson, 126 F.R.D. at 26-28. 
 125. Id. at 26 (citation omitted). 
 126. Reuben, supra note 116, at 994-96, 997-99. 
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arbitration agreements.127  The history of the FAA’s enactment demonstrates 
that the FAA was originally intended to cover contract disputes between 
merchants.128  The FAA was intended to apply solely in federal court,129 and 
the FAA was never intended to cover employment disputes or consumer 
disputes.130  Today, however, through unfortunate, erroneous decisions of 
the Supreme Court, the FAA applies broadly to employment disputes, 
consumer disputes, statutory claims, and state courts are forced to apply the 
FAA.131  Back in the 1920s, Congress enacted the FAA to create a more 
limited system of arbitration covering routine contract disputes between 
merchants, which could be resolved efficiently by other merchants serving 
as arbitrators.132  Today, however, courts have misinterpreted the FAA as 
expansively covering all types of disputes involving almost every facet of 
modern life, and courts critically rely on this vital system on a daily basis to 
alleviate their dockets of all types of civil claims.  Through the Supreme 
Court’s broad misreadings of the FAA, the Supreme Court has in effect 
created a third-and-a-half branch of the government: an expansive, extra 
layer of arbitration tribunals with binding judicial power, where parties are 
often sent without knowing or voluntary consent, and where the decisions—
on all types of disputes—are for all practical purposes final and 
unreviewable, even more final than the decisions of traditional courts.133 
Today, arbitration through the FAA can often function just like a 
compulsory, binding court system.  This expansive delegation of broad, 
 
 127. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 44-47 (1997). 
 128. See generally SZALAI, supra note 10. 
 129. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 25. 
 130. See generally SZALAI, supra note 10. 
 131. Id.; see generally MACNEIL, supra note 25. 
 132. See generally SZALAI, supra note 10. 
 133. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[S]tandard of 
review of arbitral awards is among the narrowest known to the law.”) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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binding, and virtually all-powerful authority to resolve disputes serves a vital 
public role on a macro level.  Because the Supreme Court has created 
another branch of the judiciary to aid the traditional judiciary and alleviate 
the judiciary’s burden with respect to virtually every type of non-criminal 
case, if such an expansive final system continues to exist, due process 
protections should apply to help ensure the legitimacy of such decisions 
which touch almost every aspect of American society. 
To conclude this section, there are conflicting views regarding whether 
due process applies in arbitration.  However, because of the vital public role 
arbitration serves by alleviating the burdensome caseloads of courts and 
because of the expansive use of arbitration today to resolve all kinds of 
disputes in a binding manner even when parties did not knowingly or 
voluntarily consent, due process norms should be applied to arbitration to 
help protect the rights of vulnerable parties forced into this system. 
C.   Implications of Judicial Invalidation of Severe Discovery Limits in 
Arbitration 
There is a body of case law, discussed above, analyzing whether 
discovery provisions in arbitration provide parties with a fair opportunity to 
present claims (the “arbitration discovery cases”).134  What are the 
implications of these arbitration discovery cases?  These cases suggest there 
is a developing norm of procedural fairness involving the right to pre-
hearing discovery, at least in certain limited contexts. 
As explained above, it is not clear whether due process should apply in 
arbitration, and courts and scholars have taken conflicting positions.135  If 
constitutional due process does apply to arbitration, then the analysis of the 
arbitration discovery cases can be construed as constitutional due process 
findings.  However, even if constitutional due process does not apply in 
 
 134. See supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra Section III.B. 
31
Szalai: A Constitutional Right To Discovery? Creating and Reinforcing Due
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 337, 2015] A Constitutional Right to Discovery? 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
368 
arbitration because of a lack of state action, the arbitration discovery cases 
nevertheless still set forth an analysis of procedural fairness in the arbitral 
setting.  In other words, the findings of procedural unfairness involving 
severe discovery limits are either due process findings, or, if due process is 
inapplicable to arbitration, then at a minimum, these findings constitute due 
process-like norms assessing procedural fairness.  If due process technically 
does not apply to arbitration, then these arbitration discovery cases are still 
helpful as analogous, persuasive findings regarding what procedures are due 
for a fair proceeding. 
The Supreme Court has observed that the “touchstone of due process” is 
protecting individuals from a “denial of fundamental procedural fairness.”136  
Courts have also recognized that constitutional due process is a flexible, 
fact-specific concept: 
 
Due process is malleable, calling for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.  A court may hand-tailor procedures to account for the nature of the 
affected interests and the circumstances of the threatened deprivation.  As the rubric itself 
implies, procedural due process is simply a guarantee of fair procedure.  Hence, we 
review cases involving adversarial hearings to determine whether, under the specific facts 
and circumstances of a given situation, the affected individual has had a fundamentally 
fair chance to present his or her side of the story.137 
 
Looking at these descriptions of due process, and then turning to the 
arbitration discovery cases mentioned above, courts in practice seem to be 
looking at arbitration procedures with a due process or due process-like lens.  
In the arbitration discovery cases analyzed above, the heart of the judicial 
analysis focused on a fact-specific, flexible inquiry to determine whether the 
arbitral discovery procedures provided each plaintiff “a fair opportunity to 
 
 136. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 137. In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 
603, 611 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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present her claims.”138  Constitutional due process norms similarly focus on 
this exact concept of a fundamentally fair chance to present one’s claims.139 
To summarize, the arbitration discovery cases reveal a developing norm 
of procedural fairness involving the right to pre-hearing discovery, at least in 
certain contexts.  Through these cases, one has the building blocks to argue 
there is a developing due process or due process-like norm regarding a right 
to discovery. 
What are the implications of a due process right to discovery?  It should 
be recalled that discovery as we know it today in civil litigation is a modern 
creation arising from the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938.140  With a strictly static view of due process as it existed when the due 
process clauses were adopted in 1787 and 1868, it seems that courts could 
severely restrict discovery rights since broad discovery rights did not exist 
during these times.  However, the arbitration discovery cases show a 
developing, contemporary notion that discovery is required for procedural 
fairness.  Through the arbitration discovery cases, one can argue that our 
 
 138. Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp, 433 F. Supp. 2d 538,  546 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citation 
omitted).  
 139. Yu Yun Yang v. Holder, 368 F. App’x 214, 215 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that due process 
analysis examines whether the procedures at issue denied a party “a full opportunity to present her 
claims, deprived her of fundamental fairness”); Wander v. United Ben. Life Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1541 
(9th Cir. 1990) (stating that due process examines whether a party had “a full and fair opportunity to 
develop and present facts and legal arguments in support of its position”) (citation omitted); Andela 
v. Univ. of Miami, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that due to discovery and 
other procedural protections, a plaintiff’s “due process right was not violated because he had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in the administrative proceeding”); Palmetto Alliance, Inc. 
v. S. Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 319 S.E.2d 695, 699 (S.C. 1984) (analyzing whether permitted 
discovery violated due process by “impair[ing] [the party’s] ability to prepare and present its 
evidence”).   
 140. Professor Stephen N. Subrin wrote a brilliant article exploring the history of the 
development of discovery procedures.  Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The 
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998) (“Prior to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”), discovery in civil cases in federal court was 
severely limited.  The Federal Rules discovery provisions dramatically increased the potential for 
discovery.”). 
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legal system’s treatment of discovery has radically changed over time: as 
discovery has become more the norm over the last several decades since the 
1938 adoption of the Federal Rules, discovery has grown to become a 
critical component of what is expected today for a fair proceeding. 
Could the federal or state court systems today suddenly and severely 
restrict discovery?  For example, under the supremacy clause of the United 
States Constitution, states are supposed to apply and be bound by federal 
civil rights laws.141  Imagine if a hypothetical state concluded that the costs 
of discovery for civil rights cases has become so significant that the state 
adopts a new procedural rule severely limiting discovery in its courts to one 
deposition per side.  Using the arbitration discovery cases as precedential or 
persuasive building blocks, one can argue that such a new state rule would 
be inconsistent with due process norms.  The procedural laboratory of 
arbitration, therefore, helps reinforce, define, and protect due process rights 
available in court. 
Cutting back on discovery is not a far-fetched hypothetical.  Discovery 
costs have become a significant litigation expense, particularly with the 
explosion of digital information, and how and whether to limit discovery is 
often a central part of current debates to reform America’s legal system.142  
In June 2014, the state of New York established new court procedures for 
large, complex commercial cases.143  Under the new rules, cases are 
supposed to be ready for trial in nine months.144  In order to meet this tight 
deadline, a key feature of the new procedural rules are discovery limits, 
 
 141. U.S. Const. art. VI.  
 142. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP, & U.S. CHAMBER 
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES (2010) available 
at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Litigation%2
0Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies.pdf; 2011 CONGRESSIONAL HEARING, COSTS 
AND BURDEN OF CIVIL DISCOVERY. 
 143. See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/comments/orders/AO-77-14.pdf. 
 144. Id. 
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including seven interrogatories, five requests to admit, seven depositions at 
seven hours each, and document requests limited to “those relevant to a 
claim or defense in the action” and “restricted in terms of time frame, 
subject matter and persons or entities to which the requests pertain.”145  New 
York’s new procedural rules regarding discovery do not appear to be overly 
harsh in light of the arbitration discovery cases involving one or two 
deposition limits.146  However, if a court system severely restricts discovery 
procedures, one can rely on the arbitration discovery cases to argue that a 
certain minimal level of discovery is required for procedural fairness. 
Interestingly, New York’s new procedural rules reveal another 
important dynamic between litigation and arbitration: the growth of 
arbitration helped spur the development of New York’s new procedural 
rules.  The Honorable James M. Catterson, former Justice of New York’s 
Appellate Division, First Department, has explained that the new accelerated 
court rules were designed “to provide the parties with an alternative to 
arbitration while still guarantying important procedural protection, such as 
the right to appeal the final judgment.”147  The development of the new rules 
serves as evidence that the two systems of arbitration and litigation influence 
one another.  Not only does the procedural laboratory of arbitration help 
support and define due process rights, but also the flexibility of arbitration 
can spur innovation in procedures used in the courts. 
Arbitration can have its drawbacks and be abused, but arbitration also 
provides a procedural laboratory or petri dish, with different procedural 
systems springing to life almost instantaneously through the signing of an 
arbitration agreement.  As demonstrated by the New York court system’s 
recent rule changes, courts can adopt desirable procedural rules that have 
been tested in the procedural laboratory of arbitration.  Moreover, the 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. See supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text. 




Szalai: A Constitutional Right To Discovery? Creating and Reinforcing Due
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 337, 2015] A Constitutional Right to Discovery? 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
372 
potential for a variety of systems in arbitration provides continuing 
opportunities to assess or define the meaning of procedural fairness in 
connection with different claims and fact patterns.  These assessments help 
support procedural fairness in the formal court system, and such 
opportunities for assessment would diminish in the absence of flexible, 
party-created procedures through arbitration. 
In the federal judicial system, controversy has erupted over the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly148 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.149  In these cases, the Supreme Court transformed the liberal notice 
pleading standards set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure into a more heightened “plausibility” standard.150  Under this new 
standard, a plaintiff’s complaint needs to have enough detailed facts to make 
the claim “plausible.”151  This heightened pleading standard has raised 
concerns in employment civil rights cases, where the evidence of 
wrongdoing is likely in the hands of the defendant, and without access to 
discovery, it would be challenging for a plaintiff’s complaint to contain 
sufficiently detailed facts to satisfy the plausibility standard.152  Concerns 
about discovery costs likely informed the rulings in both Twombly and Iqbal, 
since both opinions discuss the potential for expensive, disruptive 
discovery.153  It has also been argued that a motion granting a dismissal of a 
complaint pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility standard can be 
 
 148. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 149. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).   
 150. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 151. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 152. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. 
 153. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (justifying heightened plausibility pleading because “proceeding 
to antitrust discovery can be expensive”); id. at 559 (the defendants likely have “many thousands of 
employees generating reams and gigabytes of business records”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 
(recognizing the need to avoid “disruptive discovery”) (citation omitted). 
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understood as similar to a motion denying access to discovery.154  This 
analogy may help explain why so many in the legal community are troubled 
by these decisions.155  These Supreme Court decisions have in effect 
restricted discovery, and as demonstrated by the arbitration discovery cases, 
there is a developing sense that a right to pre-trial discovery has become an 
expected norm, or requirement, for procedural fairness.156 
These arbitration discovery cases reveal a broader, seismic shift that has 
been occurring over several decades in our legal system, and these changes 
reflect broader changes in society.  Our American society has shifted from 
smaller, isolated island communities, where everyone in the small 
community likely had access to the underlying facts,157 to a more global, 
complex, expansive community of today, where the relevant facts regarding 
one’s harms could be hidden across the world or in electronic data packets.  
If one looks at cases describing the elements of due process, the hallowed, 
exclusive pantheon of procedural due process traditionally included notice, 
an opportunity to be heard, and an impartial tribunal.158  This traditional list 
 
 154. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test 
to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2010) (Dismissal under plausibility standard is “effectively just 
the denial of discovery, followed by summary judgment based solely on the facts alleged in the 
complaint”). 
 155. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (“By inventing a new and foggy test for the threshold 
stage of every lawsuit, [Twombly and Iqbal] have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”). 
 156. See supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text; cf. Suzette Malveaux, Front Loading and 
Heavy Lifting; How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil 
Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (arguing that courts should allow limited 
discovery in civil rights cases at the pleading stage in order to maintain the viability of civil rights 
claims).   
 157. Subrin, supra note 140, at 695 (noting that broad discovery did not make sense in an 
earlier time period when “the jurors themselves were people in the community who had knowledge 
of the facts”). 
 158. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning 
of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be 
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (citation omitted); St. 
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developed at a time when trial was more common in the American legal 
system, and thus, this traditional list focuses on the hearing or trial itself, as 
well as receiving advance notice of this all-important hearing.  However, our 
legal system has significantly changed.  With a noticeable shift away from 
trial and a greater emphasis on pre-trial litigation as dominating the legal 
process today, the old pantheon of procedural due process seems outdated.  
So much time, effort, and money in modern litigation is spent with 
discovery; discovery is arguably the most significant component of modern 
litigation.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that a developing due process 
norm regarding a right to discovery has begun to take root.  Discovery has 
begun to rise up into the pantheon of due process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To be clear, this article is not claiming there is a clear-cut, fundamental 
right to broad, extensive discovery in all situations.  Instead, on a narrower 
plane, there is some support that limited discovery is required for a fair 
proceeding in certain contexts.  In cases that involve a significant right, such 
as the right to be free from discriminatory conduct under the civil rights 
laws, and where the relevant facts are complex and not reasonably accessible 
to the plaintiff, the discovery arbitration cases explored above159 suggest a 
minimum bundle of discovery rights must exist in order to allow a party a 
 
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (stating that due process requires 
“that the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no finding shall be made except upon 
due notice and opportunity to be heard; that the procedure at the hearing shall be consistent with the 
essentials of a fair trial; and that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for 
a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed”); Iowa Cent. 
Ry. Co. v. State of Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896) (“But it is clear that the fourteenth amendment in 
no way undertakes to control the power of a state to determine by what process legal rights may be 
asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these 
purposes gives reasonable notice, and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are 
decided.”). 
 159. See supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text. 
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fair opportunity to present his or her claim.  Although arbitration can be 
abused, the procedural laboratory of arbitration under the FAA is a valuable 
institution that can be used to study, define, reinforce, and protect due 
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